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Abstract
Stated preference practitioners are increasingly relying on internet panels to gather data, but
emerging evidence suggests potential limitations with respect to respondent and response
quality in such panels. We identify groups of inattentive respondents who have failed to
watch information videos provided in the survey to completion. Our results show that inat-
tentive respondents have a higher cost sensitivity, are more likely to have a small scale
parameter, and are more likely to ignore the non-cost attributes. These results are largely
driven by respondents failing to watch the information video about the discrete choice exper-
iment, attributes and levels, which underlines the importance of information provision and
highlights possible implications of inattentiveness. We develop a modeling framework to
simultaneously address preference, scale and attribute processing heterogeneity. We find that
when we consider attribute non-attendance—scale differences disappear, which suggests that
the type of heterogeneity detected in a model could be the result of un-modeled heterogeneity
of a different kind. We discuss implications of our results.
Keywords Discrete choice experiments · Probabilistic decision process model · Latent
class · Internet panels · Inattentive bias · Attribute non-attendance
JEL Classification C25 · H41 · Q51 · Q57
1 Introduction
The purpose of many stated preference surveys is to derive willingness-to-pay or welfare
measures to use in cost benefit analysis. Over the past two decades, stated preference practi-
tioners have increasingly relied on internet panels to administer surveys and gather data (see
Lindhjem and Navrud 2011b, for an overview). Respondents in such surveys are required
to exert considerable effort to provide thoughtful and accurate answers to truthfully reveal
their preferences. This has led several researchers to voice concerns regarding respondent
B Erlend Dancke Sandorf
erlend.dancke.sandorf@slu.se
1 Department of Forest Economics, Centre for Environmental and Resource Economics, Swedish
University of Agricultural Sciences, 90183 Umeå, Sweden
123
E. D. Sandorf
and response quality in such panels (see e.g. Börger 2016; Börjesson and Fosgerau 2015;
Gao et al. 2016b; Hess et al. 2013; Lindhjem and Navrud 2011a; Windle and Rolfe 2011;
Baker et al. 2010; Heerwegh and Loosveldt 2008). These concerns range from speeding
behavior and inattentiveness to respondents trying to qualify for panel membership or sur-
vey participation by acting dishonestly (fraudulently). These “low-quality” respondents have
been identified through low-probability screening questions (Gao et al. 2016b; Jones et al.
2015b), “trap-questions” or “red herrings” (Baker and Downes-Le Guin 2007; Baker et al.
2010), and hidden speeding metrics (Börger 2016). Once identified, these respondents have
commonly been excluded from the panel or analysis (Jones et al. 2015b; Baker et al. 2010).
In this paper we argue that simply excluding these respondents from the sample is misguided
and unnecessary,1 and that inattentiveness or dishonesty can show itself as additional het-
erogeneity. As such, we make hypotheses regarding these respondents’ behavior and instead
use models that are able to capture this.
We identify two main groups of respondents using a combination of information gathered
by hidden speed metrics and follow-up questions. In the survey, we provided information
about the good to be valued and the discrete choice experiment using two information videos.
By measuring how long respondents stayed on the survey pages with the videos, we know that
if they moved ahead with the survey in less time than it would take to watch the video, then
they cannot have watched it to completion, and we classify them as inattentive. In the follow-
up questions we asked respondents whether they watched the entire video to completion. By
combining these two pieces of information we create a measure of dishonesty, or a willingness
to deceive.2 Inattentiveness is associated with speeding and dishonesty is likely associated
with a fear of being disqualified from the survey coupled with social desirability bias. Since,
the type of “trap question” used to identify dishonest respondents is distinctly different
from those used in the literature to identify fraudulence, we provide a discussion of these
approaches in Sect. 2. We hypothesize that inattentiveness is symptomatic of spending less
effort throughout the survey. It is reasonable to assume that a respondent spending less effort
also spends less time carefully deliberating on their choices. Indeed, looking at speeding
behavior Börger (2016) found that respondents rushing through the survey had relatively
more stochastic choices as seen from the econometrician’s point of view, which can partly
be explained by less deliberation, and Gao et al. (2016b) find that respondents failing a
trap question had larger variance in their willingness-to-pay estimates. Furthermore, when
individuals face complex and difficult choices they tend to fall back on simplifying strategies
and heuristics to reduce the cognitive burden of the choice and hence the effort necessary to
make it (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011). One such strategy, which we test in this paper,
is ignoring one or more of the attributes in the choice tasks, also known as attribute non-
attendance (AN-A) (see e.g. Campbell et al. 2011; Hensher et al. 2005). We hypothesize that
inattentive respondents are more likely to ignore attributes. For example, if you do not pay
close attention throughout the survey, then it is possible that you also pay less attention to all
of the attribute information provided in the choice tasks. Failing to consider the actual choice
behavior of respondents can lead to biased estimates and wrong inferences drawn regarding
preferences. Given this we identify and test the following two hypotheses: (i) inattentive
respondents have a relatively more stochastic choice process, and (ii) inattentive respondents
are more likely to ignore attributes on the choice cards. The majority of discussions relating to
1 Eliminating these respondents leads to a loss of the random sampling properties and can make out-of-sample
aggregation invalid. Furthermore, choices made by respondents who missed a directive or failed a follow-up
question still represents a choice and an expression of preferences.
2 We provide more details on exactly how this was done in Sects. 4 and 5.
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dishonest respondents deal with those who fraudulently tries to qualify for panel membership
or survey participation (Baker et al. 2010). It is believed that these respondents are “in it for
the money” or want their opinions heard (Baker et al. 2010), and as such they are a source of
possibly lower quality answers. However, this is mostly related to ‘opt-in’ panels and surveys.
In our case, where initial sampling to participate in the panel and survey was random, there
is less information to form a priori hypotheses. That said, given the way we are identifying
dishonest respondents in this paper—as a sub-group of inattentive respondents—we would
expect that their behavior is either less or more extreme, relative to inattentive ones. As such
we test the same hypotheses for dishonest respondents.
To test our hypotheses we develop a modeling framework that can jointly test both hypothe-
ses. The model extends those used in Thiene et al. (2014) and Campbell et al. (2018) by using a
mixed logit to capture preference heterogeneity, and Thiene et al. (2014) by inferring attribute
non-attendance allowing for all possible AN-A patterns. The model allows us to capture pos-
sible scale differences and respondents ignoring attributes up to a probability. Our results
show that inattentive respondents have a higher cost sensitivity, are more likely to have a
small scale parameter, and are more likely to ignore the non-cost attributes. These results
are largely driven by respondents failing to watch the information video about the discrete
choice experiment, attributes and levels. While confirming previous results that inattention
is linked to higher error-variance, we show that it might not be inattention in general that
is the problem, but rather inattention at a crucial point in the survey, which led to a lack
of information on how to complete the choice tasks. This suggests that proper information
provision is crucial and can to some extent avoid respondents ignoring attributes. Further-
more, we find that inattentive respondents are more likely to attend to the cost attribute. This
suggests a strategy involving focusing on the more familiar or self-explanatory attributes. In
line with most results in the attribute non-attendance literature (see e.g. Colombo et al. 2013;
Campbell et al. 2008; Hensher et al. 2005), we find that considering such behavior leads to
substantially lower willingness-to-pay estimates.
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows: Section 2 provides background to the investi-
gations undertaken in this paper, Sect. 3 outlines the theoretical framework, Sect. 4 introduces
the empirical case study and data, Section 5 discusses the results and Sect. 6 concludes the
paper.
2 Background
Internet panels are often divided into probability- and non-probability based, where the former
recruits members using, for example, random digit dialing, while the latter uses recruitment
campaigns, banner ads on web-pages and social media (Baker et al. 2010). While we use a
probability based panel in this study, it is nonetheless important to recognize the steps taken
to improve data quality in non-probability based internet panels since much of the research
by both industry and academia deals with respondent and response quality in such panels
(Baker et al. 2010). An initial concern relates to individuals who misrepresent themselves to
qualify for either panel membership or survey participation. It is argued that these individuals
are often members of multiple panels and seek to answer as many surveys as possible for
the monetary reward. As such, they are neither interested in the topic of the survey nor
to provide thoughtful answers. This can lead to lower data quality (Baker and Downes-
Le Guin 2007). Furthermore, this suggests that non-probability panels might be plagued
by self-selection issues to a larger extent relative to probability based panels where opting
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to be a member of the panel is not possible (see e.g. Lindhjem and Navrud 2011a, b, for
a discussion). Self-selection issues aside, some survey companies and practitioners have
included low-probability screening questions to filter out respondents who attempt to falsely
qualify for survey participation (Baker et al. 2010; Jones et al. 2015b). These respondents
are sometimes dropped in “real time” before even completing the survey, and if not, they
are usually excluded prior to analysis (Baker and Downes-Le Guin 2007; Baker et al. 2010).
A low-probability screening question is designed to be survey specific. For example, in a
survey on food choice, the screening question can be of the form: “Please select the items
you own/currently purchase from the list below”, where it is unlikely that someone would
own/purchase more than one of the low-probability items on the list. Chandler and Paolacci
(2017) find that people are indeed willing to lie to gain entry to surveys, but that they do
not immediately perceive early questions as screening questions, and they do not try to
strategically answer them unless it is clear that they are screening questions, for example, if
the study is targeting a specific demographic. This type of fraudulent respondents is unlikely
to be present in the current dataset for two main reasons: (i) we use data from a probability
based internet panel (details in Sect. 4), and (ii) we used generic invitation e-mails when
recruiting respondents to participate. That said, if respondents do perceive the follow-up
questions as qualifiers, then they might have an incentive to be dishonest.
Researchers’ concern with inattentive respondents is often attributed to Krosnick (1991)
and his ideas about survey satisficing behavior (Baker and Downes-Le Guin 2007). Respon-
dents engaging in such behavior often have short completion times; non-differentiate on
rating scales or straight-line, i.e always choose the same response in a battery of Likert scale
questions; have high levels of item non-response; do “mental coin-flipping”; and choose a
“don’t know” or opt-out response if available (Krosnick 1991; Baker and Downes-Le Guin
2007; Baker et al. 2010). This implies that respondents have not paid close attention to the
questions and possibly given answers that are not a true reflection of their attitudes or prefer-
ences. The problem is that this might lead to lower quality data. In addition to the behaviors
characterized as survey satisficing—a common way to identify inattentive respondents is
to use trap questions (also called instructional manipulation checks (IMC), red herrings,
validation-, and screening questions) (see e.g. Oppenheimer et al. 2009; Baker et al. 2010;
Berinsky et al. 2014). Individuals failing these trap questions have not given a deliberately
false answer, but missed a directive or answered incorrectly through carelessness. Questions
of this type usually instruct respondents to give a particular response to a question or state-
ment, for example, “For data quality purposes, please select ’strongly agree’ ” and can be
placed in a battery of Likert scale questions (Baker et al. 2010), and sometimes respondents
are even asked to ignore the response format (Oppenheimer et al. 2009). Failing a trap ques-
tion like this is likely linked to survey satisficing and shorter response times (speeding), which
is indicative of spending less effort in the survey. Some researchers suggest that respondents
who fail trap questions and provide strong indications of survey satisficing behavior should
be considered as candidates for deletion (Baker and Downes-Le Guin 2007; Heerwegh and
Loosveldt 2008; Baker et al. 2010). For example, Heerwegh and Loosveldt (2008) excluded
all respondents with completion times above 3 hours based on the likelihood that they were
interrupted while completing the survey. However, they provided no additional information
or justification for this choice. Downes-Le Guin et al. (2012) found that respondents who
passed and failed the trap questions embedded in their survey showed no difference in terms of
self-reported engagement scores, which suggests that the connection between inattentiveness
and engagement might be weaker than initially thought.
Looking at the stated preference literature, fewer papers have been concerned with inat-
tentive respondents. For example, Jones et al. (2015b) test whether inattentive respondents
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are more likely to violate the weak and strong axioms of revealed preference in a stated pref-
erence experiment on blueberries. Indeed, they find that respondents failing the screening
metrics are more likely to violate the axioms of revealed preference, and that they pro-
vide answers that are less consistent. They suggest that these respondents are candidates for
deletion in combination with additional metrics. In a different paper, Jones et al. (2015a)
hypothesize that respondents who fail screening metrics are more likely to ignore attributes
in the choice tasks and have a smaller scale parameter, i.e. a higher error variance. They
test both independently and use an equality constrained latent class model to infer attribute
non-attendance and a scaled mixed logit model to attempt to disentangle scale and preference
heterogeneity. In both cases they find that removing inattentive respondents from the sample
lead to better model fits. In the AN-A model they find that removing these respondents leads
to a reduction in the percentage of respondents predicted to ignore all attributes, and the
price attribute in particular. Running separate models on respondents passing and failing the
screening metrics they find that respondents who fail have larger variance as measured by
the scale parameter. While we test similar hypotheses, in this paper we use a state-of-the-art
approach to identifying AN-A and estimate relative scale differences simultaneously, as well
as retaining all respondents in the analysis. Gao et al. (2016b) use a single trap question to
identify inattentive respondents and find that younger and low income respondents are more
likely to fail the trap question, and suggest over-sampling this group to increase overall data
quality. This finding is in line with Anduiza and Galais (2016) who find that respondents who
pass and fail IMCs are significantly different on key demographic characteristics, and that
respondents who fail are often younger, less educated and less motivated by the topic of the
survey, which exacerbates their concern that eliminating these respondents could increase
sample bias. Running separate models on respondents who fail and pass the trap question,
Gao et al. (2016b) find that the model for the group that passed fit the data better and that the
estimated willingness-to-pay had smaller variation. However, they do not recommend dele-
tion of respondents who fail a single trap question, but that these respondents are candidates
for deletion when seen in connection with other survey satisficing behaviors, e.g. speeding
and straight-lining (Baker et al. 2010). In a different study Gao et al. (2016a), like Jones et al.
(2015b), test the impact of inattentive respondents on adherence to the axioms of revealed
preference. Running separate models for respondents who pass and fail the trap question,
they find that respondents failing the question are more likely to violate the weak axiom of
revealed preference, have higher mean willingness-to-pay and higher variance. They find
that respondents failing the trap question are younger, have lower income, less likely to be
Caucasian and less likely to have higher education. They do not recommend removal of
these respondents since it can lead to sample bias, but like Gao et al. (2016b) they suggest
over-sampling of respondents who fail the trap questions to increase overall data quality.
Malone and Lusk (2018) use three different trap questions implemented in three different
surveys that differ in complexity (difficulty). They find that the three questions trap different
types of respondents, and that the most difficult trap question (a long text with directions)
traps the most respondents. Interestingly, they find little connection between survey time
and inattention and that in 2 of the surveys the mean completion time was was not different
between the two groups of respondents. They find that estimated willingness-to-pay differ
between respondents and that it could potentially bias policy relevant measures. They do not
recommend deleting respondents who fail trap-questions, but rather support the idea of using
an inattentive weighting scale as proposed by Berinsky et al. (2014), or give respondents who
failed the question the option to revise their answer. If they still fail, they would be candidates
for deletion.
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3 Theoretical Framework andModel Specification
3.1 Background Notation
When analyzing discrete choice data we assume that respondents act according to random
utility theory, and choose the alternative in each choice task that maximizes utility. This
implies trading off between, and considering, all attributes and alternatives. We assume that a
respondent’s utility can be described by one observable deterministic and one unobservable
stochastic component. To introduce notation and develop the models, we assume that the
utility of respondent n choosing alternative i in choice situation t can be expressed by Eq. 1:
Unit = β ′xnit + εnit , (1)
where β is a vector of parameters to be estimated, xnit is a vector of attributes and εnit
is a type I extreme value distributed error term π2/6s2, with var(εnit ) = s2. Given these
assumptions; the probability of the sequence of choices yn =< in1, in2, . . . , inTn > over the
Tn choice situations faced by respondent n, can be expressed by the multinomial logit (MNL)
model (McFadden 1974).
Pr(yn |xn) =
Tn∏
t=1
exp(λβ ′xnit )∑J
j=1 exp(λβ ′xnjt )
, (2)
where λ is a scale parameter, which we assume equal to unity (an assumption we relax in the
next section). While widely used, the MNL model assumes homogeneous preferences. We
believe that this assumption is unlikely to hold and that it is better to allow for heterogeneous
preferences by specifying distributions for the parameters. Let the joint density of the param-
eters [βn1, βn2, . . . , βnK ] be expressed as f (θn |), where k indexes the attributes, θn is a
vector of random parameters and  the parameters of the distributions. Then, we can write
the unconditional probability as the integral over the logit formula for all possible values of
θ . This model is often referred to as the mixed logit or random parameter logit model.
Pr(yn |xn,) =
∫ Tn∏
t=1
exp(λβ ′xnit )∑J
j=1 exp(λβ ′xnjt )
f (θn |)d(θn) (3)
This integral does not have a closed form solution, but we approximate it using simulation.
To test for the marginal impact of inattentiveness on the mean of the parameter distributions,
we can specify βn as: βn = β¯ + ζdn +σηn , where β¯ is the mean, ζ a vector of parameters to
be estimated, dn a vector of dummy variables indicating whether a respondent is inattentive,
dishonest or both, σ the standard deviation and ηn a normally distributed variable.3
3.2 The Latent Scale Class Model
In the standard models outlined above, the scale parameter λ and the vector of parameters
β are not separately identified and the model estimates are in fact the product λβ. Standard
practice is to assume that the scale parameter is constant and equal to unity. However, if
this assumption is violated, then we get confounded estimates of the preference part-worths
3 We recognize that including inattentiveness or dishonesty in this manner may lead to endogeneity bias,
however, we believe it is of interest to see how being classified as inattentive or dishonest might influence the
mean of the preference distribution.
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(Swait and Louviere 1993). It is easy to see that this is the case given the inverse relationship
between the scale parameter and error variance. For example, if the variance of the stochastic
part of utility is large, then the scale parameter is small and the product λβ will be small.
Assuming scale equal to unity implies that the error variance is equal across respondents
and groups of respondents. One interpretation of scale, which we adopt here, is that it rep-
resents choice determinism, i.e. as error variance approaches infinity, scale limits to zero
and choice resembles a purely random process as seen from the perspective of the econo-
metrician (Swait and Louviere 1993; Magidson and Vermunt 2007). We hypothesize that
inattentive respondents have a less deterministic choice process from the practitioner’s point
of view, i.e. a smaller scale. The problem of scale heterogeneity can be particularly challeng-
ing in a latent class framework. Magidson and Vermunt (2007) point out that respondents
with equal preference weights but different degrees of choice certainty might be incorrectly
sorted into separate preference classes and suggest a scale extended (adjusted) latent class
model, whereby subgroups within a class can differ with respect to choice certainty, i.e. error
variance. Variations of the scale adjusted latent class model (Magidson and Vermunt 2007)
have been successfully applied by e.g. Campbell et al. (2011) in the context of rural landscape
improvement, Thiene et al. (2012) for forest conversion and biodiversity, Flynn et al. (2010)
within health economics, and Mueller et al. (2010) in the context of wine labels.
We do recognize that subgroups of respondents might differ in scale, particularly that
attentive and inattentive, as well as honest and dishonest, respondents have different error
variances. However, our model departs from the traditional scale adjusted latent class model
in two important ways: (1) we do not segment respondents into latent classes based on
preferences, rather we segment them based on different scales and (2) we let preferences be
described by a mixed logit model. This allow us to treat the scale parameter itself as latent
and make probabilistic statements about the likelihood that a respondent belongs in a class
with a relatively higher (lower) scale parameter. It explicitly allows us to test hypothesis 1
through the probability of being in a particular scale class. This implies that we assume a
common underlying preference structure for both attentive and inattentive respondents, i.e.
the mixed logit model , but allow them to differ in choice certainty. We operationalize this
using an equality constraint on preferences. We call this model the latent scale class model.
We write the unconditional (prior) probability that respondent n belongs to scale class s,
s =< 1, . . . , S >, as:
ψns = exp(αs + ξsdn)∑S
s=1 exp(αs + ξsdn)
(4)
where αs is a class constant, ξs a vector of parameters to be estimated and dn a vector of
dummy variables indicating whether a respondent is classified as either inattentive, dishonest
or both—with one parameter vector set to zero for identification. The unconditional choice
probability can be expressed as in Eq. 5:
Pr(yn |xn, ψn,) =
S∑
s=1
ψns
∫ Tn∏
t=1
exp(μsβ ′xnit )∑J
j=1 exp(μsβ ′xnjt )
f (θn |)d(θn) (5)
where ψns is the unconditional probability relating to μs . We set scale equal to unity in one
class for identification and use an exponential transformation to allow scale to be positive and
freely estimated in the other classes, e.g. μs = exp(λs). Again the integral does not have an
analytical solution, but is approximated using simulation. We recognize the contribution by
Campbell et al. (2018) who also use a latent scale class model to accommodate different scales,
however, our approach departs from theirs in that we assume that preference heterogeneity
can be described by a mixed logit model as opposed to a latent class model.
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3.3 Discrete Mixture Random Parameter Logit Model
A growing body of research shows that respondents in discrete choice experiments adopt a
range of possible heuristics and simplifying strategies, for example ignoring one or more of
the attributes in the choice tasks (Hensher et al. 2005; Hensher and Greene 2010; Campbell
et al. 2011). This type of boundedly rational behavior is a deviation from random utility
theory, and failing to take this into account can lead to wrong inferences with respect to
preferences. We hypothesize that inattentive respondents have spent less effort on the choice
tasks and as such are more likely to ignore attributes, a behavior known as attribute non-
attendance (AN-A). To consider the full range of AN-A behavior we need to consider 2k
possible combinations of attending to or ignoring attributes. We assume that non-attendance
rates are independent across attributes and use a discrete mixture model to calculate the
class probabilities (see e.g. Campbell et al. 2010; Hole 2011; Sandorf et al. 2017). Let the
unconditional probability that respondent n attends to attribute k be denoted π1nk and the
probability that she ignores it π0nk = 1 − π1nk . We estimate the probability of attendance
according to Eq. 6:
π1nk =
1
1 + exp(−(αk + γkdn)) (6)
where α is a constant, γ a vector of parameters to be estimated and dn a vector of dummy
variables indicating inattentiveness or dishonesty. Letting k = {1, 2, 3, 4} index the attributes
and q =< 1, . . . , Q > index all possible combinations of attending to or ignoring the
attributes, we calculate the discrete mixing distribution (class membership probabilities) as
follows:
Q =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
q = 1 → ωn1 = π0n1π0n2π0n3π0n4
q = 2 → ωn2 = π0n1π0n2π0n3π1n4
q = 3 → ωn3 = π0n1π0n2π1n3π0n4
q = 4 → ωn4 = π0n1π0n2π1n3π1n4
...
q = Q → ωnQ = π1n1π1n2π1n3π1n4
(7)
We accommodate attribute non-attendance by restricting the parameter on the ignored
attribute to zero in the likelihood function (Hensher et al. 2005). Specifically, we introduce a
masking vector δq taking on the value 1 for classes in which the corresponding value of π1nk
was used to determine class probability and 0 otherwise. Then we can write the unconditional
choice probability as follows:
Pr(yn |xn, ωn,) =
Q∑
q=1
ωnq
∫ Tn∏
t=1
exp(λδqβ ′xnit )∑J
j=1 exp(λδqβ ′xnjt )
f (θn |)d(θn) (8)
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where ωnq is the unconditional probability relating to the masking vector δq and λ assumed
equal to unity. We allow preferences to follow continuous distributions, i.e. a mixed logit
model, to minimize the risk of classifying respondents with low taste intensities as ignor-
ing a particular attribute (Hess et al. 2013). The integral in Eq. 8 is approximated through
simulation.
3.4 Latent Scale Class Discrete Mixture Random Parameter Logit Model
So far we have outlined models that consider two types of heterogeneity—either preference
and scale heterogeneity, or preference and attribute processing heterogeneity. There is grow-
ing recognition that failing to appropriately consider different types of heterogeneity may
bias estimates (Thiene et al. 2014; Campbell et al. 2018). Here we seek to develop a model
that simultaneously disentangles preference, scale and attribute processing heterogeneity.
Possibly the first paper to attempt to disentangle the three types of heterogeneity is Thiene
et al. (2014). They use a finite mixture framework and allow for correlations between the
different types of heterogeneity. Our model differ from theirs in three key aspects: (1) We
use a mixed logit rather than a latent class model to capture preference heterogeneity, (2)
we consider all possible combinations of attending to and ignoring attributes, and (3) we
do not allow for correlations between the different types of heterogeneity. As such, we pro-
vide some extensions to their modeling approach. A recent contribution disentangling the
three sources of heterogeneity is Campbell et al. (2018). Like Thiene et al. (2014), they use
a latent class model to capture preference heterogeneity, but they do not consider attribute
non-attendance—rather, they focus on a choice set generation heuristic that bear some simi-
larities to elimination-by-aspects. As such—the methodological contribution of the present
paper is to operationalize a model that allows for preference heterogeneity through a mixed
logit model and the full 2k AN-A patterns.
Consider a respondent whose choice behavior is described by a class in which all but one
attribute is ignored. Her choices are likely to be noisy since only the considered attribute
is a predictor of choice. Hence, the product λβ will be small, however, her β might not be.
Consequently, failing to consider scale heterogeneity in this model could lead to a possible
downward bias in our estimates. We specify the probabilities of being in a particular scale-
and AN-A class to be independent and functions of whether a given respondent is identified
as inattentive or dishonest (i.e. Eqs. 4, 6).4 By combining Eqs. 5 and 8 we get a model
that allows us to consider all three types of heterogeneity: preference-, scale- and attribute
processing. The unconditional choice probability can be expressed by Eq. 9:
Pr(yn |xn, ωn, ψn,) =
Q∑
q=1
ωnq
[ S∑
s=1
ψns
∫ Tn∏
t=1
exp(μsδqβ ′xnit )∑J
j=1 exp(μsδqβ ′xnjt )
f (θn |)d(θn)
]
(9)
This probability does not have closed form solution and hence we approximate it using
simulation.
4 If these two probabilities are not independent, then the probability of being in a particular scale- and AN-A
class is not the product of the two. Specifying both probabilities to be functions of inattentiveness might lead
to poorer model fit, however, it does make the model more tractable and it is easier to interpret the key aspects
of interest.
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3.5 Conditional Estimates
We can use Bayes’ theorem to obtain the conditional class membership probabilities (Train
2009). These probabilities are conditional on a respondent’s sequence of choices, i.e. individ-
ual specific. We show the formula for calculating conditional probabilities from the attribute
non-attendance models in Eq. 10. The approach for the latent scale class model is identical.
ωq|n = ωnq Pr(yn |xn, ωn,)∑Q
q=1 ωnq Pr(yn |xn, ωn,)
(10)
We can also obtain the conditional (i.e. individual specific) willingness-to-pay estimates using
the same approach. Given our linear-in-the-parameters utility function we can define WTP
as the negative ratio of the non-cost to the cost attribute, i.e. υ = −βknon_cost/βkcost . Next,
we can obtain the conditional WTP distributions by integrating over the distribution of WTP
conditional on the sequence of choices and weighted by the conditional class probabilities
as shown in Eq. 11. The mean of this distribution gives and indication as to where a given
respondent lies on the willingness-to-pay distribution.
υ¯n =
Q∑
q=1
ωq|n
∫
υ Pr(yn |xn, ωn,) f (θn |)d(θn)∫
Pr(yn |xn, ωn,) f (θn |)d(θn) (11)
In the models that consider attribute non-attendance behavior we need to be aware that in the
classes where either the non-cost or cost parameters were restricted to zero, WTP is not defined
(i.e. in practice would be zero or infinity). We consider this explicitly by only calculating
WTP for classes where both the non-cost and cost attributes were considered. Remember
that we have 24 = 16 possible AN-A classes, and in half of these the parameter estimate on
any attribute is restricted to zero. This leaves 4 classes where any given attribute and cost are
considered. The willingness-to-pay for a non-cost attribute is then the weighted sum across
these four classes, where the weights are the conditional probabilities of class membership as
well as the conditional probability that the considered class is any of the four viable classes.
3.6 Model Estimation
All models are estimated in Ox v. 7.1 (Doornik 2009) using 1000 scrambled Halton draws
(Bhat 2003). We ran each model multiple times with different starting vectors chosen at ran-
dom to increase our certainty of reaching a global maximum, and selected the final models
based on log-likelihood value and the AIC statistic. We assume that the estimated parameters
for the size attributes follow log-normal distributions,5 the parameters for the industry and
habitat attributes follow normal distributions and the cost parameter follows a log-normal
distribution with sign change. A log-normal distribution is by definition positive, and we
force a sign change by multiplying the distribution by − 1. Since it is more appropriate to
allow all parameters to follow distributions when inferring AN-A (Hess et al. 2013), we allow
all parameters to follow distributions in all models to make clear the effect of adding addi-
tional layers of heterogeneity, i.e. scale and attribute non-attendance, on top of unobserved
preference heterogeneity.
5 We also tried using normal distributions for these parameters, but this led to unreasonably large estimates
for some attributes and numerical instability in the final models. This could be the result of an identification
problem since the normal distribution covers zero. Consider a respondent that either ignores the attribute or is
just indifferent. This respondent could fall into classes where the value is zero and where it is non-zero, but
overlaps zero.
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Table 1 Attributes and attribute levels
Attribute
Level
Size of
protected area
Protected area
attractive for
industry
Protected area
important
habitat for fish
Cost of the
management
scenarioi
Status Quo 2245 km2 Partly Partly NOK 0
Level 1 5000 km2 Attractive for the fisheries Not important NOK 100
Level 2 10,000 km2 Attractive for oil and gas Important NOK 200
Level 3 Attractive for both NOK 500
Level 4 Not attractive to either industry NOK 1000
i NOK 1 = e0.1045
4 Empirical Case Study and Data
To test our hypotheses we use data from an online discrete choice experiment aimed at eliciting
the Norwegian population’s preferences for increased cold-water coral protection (Sandorf
et al. 2016).6 These ecosystems are considered biodiversity hot-spots in the deep sea, and
habitat for a large number of species (Fosså et al. 2002). Despite their apparent beneficial
ecosystem services, they are under pressure from human activities, e.g. bottom trawling,
hydrocarbon exploration and production, aquaculture and ocean dumping (Freiwald et al.
2004). In the DCE, each respondent made a sequence of 12 choices, each choice consisted
of three alternatives described by four attributes. The selection of attributes was based on a
review of the literature and expert interviews before the survey was tested in focus groups
with experts and the general public (Aanesen et al. 2015). We used a Bayesian efficient design
procedure where efficiency was determined based on minimizing the Db-error (Scarpa and
Rose 2008). The design was optimized for the multinomial logit model and updated based on
pilot studies to obtain more precise priors. We show the attributes and corresponding levels
in Table 1 and a sample choice card in Fig. 4.
The survey took place in August 2014 and we used a sampling quota of 500 respondents7
from a probability based internet panel run by Norstat AS.8 Respondents were sampled to
be representative with respect to gender, age and geographic location. Invited respondents
received a generic e-mail invitation to participate in a survey that would last 25 min and
receive 50 reward points for participating.
In the invitation e-mail there was a link taking respondents to the beginning of the survey
and a 9-min video presentation about cold-water corals. The video covered, among other
things, current knowledge and status of the ecosystem, and protection legislation. Immedi-
ately following the video, respondents filled in the first part of the survey including some
6 This data was first used by Sandorf et al. (2016) who compared results obtained from a series of valuation
workshops to those obtained using a probability based internet panel. The internet DCE is identical to the one
developed and implemented in valuation workshops used by Aanesen et al. (2015).
7 In total, 3462 potential respondents received the invitation to participate, 761 began the survey and 500
completed the survey.
8 Norstat AS was founded in 2003 and has the largest internet panel in Norway with 80,000 registered members.
Panel members are recruited in two ways: (i) after a phone interview where respondents were recruited by
random digit dialing (RDD) or (ii) RDD specifically to recruit members to the panel. Sampling to participate in
any given survey once a person is a member of the panel depends on the survey. Respondents are compensated
in points based on the length and type of survey. These points can be exchanged for gift cards or donated
to charity. For example, 200 reward points can be exchanged for a NOK 200 gift certificate. This level of
compensation is common for this type of survey in Norway.
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general questions about marine governance and a short quiz over the material covered (LaR-
iviere et al. 2014). Next, respondents watched a second video describing the discrete choice
experiment, attributes and levels, before filling in the rest of the survey. We displayed each
choice card on a separate screen and included a link on each page that would open a descrip-
tion of the attributes and levels in a separate browser window. This description contained the
exact same information as covered in the video.
5 Results
5.1 The Identification of Inattentive and Dishonest Respondents
We identify inattentive and dishonest respondents using a combination of hidden speed
metrics and follow-up questions. In Table 2 we show a summary of the definitions used
and the size of the groups identified. Inattentive respondents are identified using hidden
speed metrics. Specifically, we measured how long respondents stayed on the pages with the
videos, and if they moved ahead with the survey in less time than it would take to watch the
video to completion, we classify them as inattentive. Using this information we create three
measures of inattentiveness: (i) move forward without watching the first video to completion,
(ii) move forward without watching the second video to completion, and (iii) move forward
without watching either video to completion. As such the final measure is stricter in terms
of identifying inattentive respondents. The last two questions in the survey read: “Did you
watch the entire video about cold-water corals?” and “Did you watch the entire video about
the discrete choice experiment?”9 Combining this information with the data on whether a
respondent stayed on the pages with the videos long enough to have watched them, i.e.
our measures of inattentiveness, we identify respondents giving a clearly incorrect answer
to these follow-up questions. For example, a respondent who hasn’t watched video 1 might
state that he did. We label these respondents dishonest. If a respondent perceives this question
as a “qualifier” for survey completion and consequently compensation, then he would want
to lie; or it could be a form of social desirability at play in that he wants to state that he did
what was asked of him even though he did not.
In Table 3 we show summary statistics for all groups of respondents across relevant socio-
demographic characteristics. We see that, on average, more men tended to not watch the videos
to completion, but that when it comes to lying about it on the follow-up questions, there are no
significant differences between men and women. In general, there are no differences between
the groups in terms of age, except for weak significance at the 10 percent level between A2
and I2. Furthermore, we see that across all groupings we have significantly fewer respondents
with higher education among those identified as either inattentive or dishonest, but that this
does not translate into significantly different distributions of income. As part of the survey,
after watching the first video, respondents filled in a multiple choice quiz with eight questions
over the material covered in the video. We see that across all groupings, respondents classified
as either inattentive or dishonest have fewer correct answers (one on the median).10 However,
how well a respondent did on the quiz is only weakly correlated with education (Table 4).
Taking a closer look at the completion times we see that across all groupings, inattentive and
dishonest respondents spend less time on both the survey as a whole and on the choice cards.
9 We put these two questions at the very end so that they would not influence other results.
10 Sandorf et al. (2016) also discuss the connection between the quiz and watching the videos.
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Table 2 The share of inattentive and dishonest respondents in the sample
Variable Abbr. Definition Share
Inattentive 1 I1 Did not watch Video 1 to completion 0.26
Attentive 1 A1 Watched Video 1 to completion 0.74
Inattentive 2 I2 Did not watch Video 2 to completion 0.23
Attentive 2 A2 Watched Video 2 to completion 0.77
Inattentive 1 & 2 I Did not watch either video to completion 0.18
Attentive 1 & 2 A Watched both videos to completion 0.82
Dishonest 1 D1 Did not watch Video 1, but stated that they did 0.15
Honest 1 H1 The complement of Dishonest 1 0.85
Dishonest 2 D2 Did not watch Video 2, but stated that they did 0.10
Honest 2 H2 The complement of Dishonest 2 0.90
Dishonest 1 & 2 D Did not watch either video but stated that they did 0.07
Honest 1 & 2 H The complement of Dishonest 0.93
The large difference for the survey as a whole is likely caused by the length of the videos,
and the difference on the choice cards may be caused by additional speeding behavior.11
In Table 4 we show the correlations between our measures of inattentiveness and dishon-
esty, and education; quiz score; and time spent on the survey and choice tasks. Perhaps of
most interest are the measures entering the same models, i.e. I1 and I2, D1 and D2, and I
and D. We see that the correlation between these variables range from 0.54 to 0.66, which
suggests that they are moderately positively correlated. Furthermore, we see that there is a
negative correlation between inattentiveness and score on the quiz, and that it is stronger for
first video compared to the second video. This is expected since the first video came before
the quiz and included all necessary information to obtain a perfect score. This is in line with
the results reported in Table 3. Given that cold-water corals are unfamiliar to most people,
prior knowledge about them is unlikely. We note that the correlation between dishonesty and
the quiz score is weaker, which is most likely caused by dishonesty being a subset of inat-
tentiveness (as defined here). Furthermore we note that the relationships between education
and the measures of inattentiveness and dishonesty are weak and negative. This suggests that
while there are differences between the groups in terms of education, the correlation is rather
weak.
The preceding investigation into the measures of inattentiveness and dishonesty shows that
they are linked to speeding behavior and to education, but that the correlations are relatively
weak. While inattentive and dishonest respondents are faster, our measures are different
from that of pure speeding behavior. In the following we present three sets of models using
disaggregate and separate measures of inattentiveness and dishonesty, and models using
aggregate measures in the same modeling framework. This allows us to explore the effect
and impact of these respondents.
11 We are using Winsorized means to avoid the influence of extreme outliers in the distribution of time spent
on the survey and the choice tasks. For example, Winsorized at the 90th percentile means that any value above
the 90th is set to the 90th. If we include all observations, the difference between the groups is insignificant and
in some cases opposite. This is purely driven by more people with extreme completion times (several days) in
the groups identified as inattentive or dishonest.
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5.2 Estimation Results
In Table 5 we show the first set of models based on the definitions of inattentiveness outlined
in Table 2. The models increase in complexity from left to right, where each new model adds
a new layer. We start with the random parameter logit model (RPL, Eq. 3), which serves as a
reference for comparison. Next, we introduce observed heterogeneity in the mean by adding
interaction terms for inattentiveness. Third, we allow for possible differences in error variance
using a latent scale class (LSC) model where we accommodate preference heterogeneity using
an RPL model (Eq. 5). Fourth, we use a discrete mixture random parameter logit (DM-RPL)
model to uncover attribute non-attendance (Eq. 8), and finally, we combine the two models
to simultaneously capture preference, scale and processing heterogeneity in a model we call
the latent scale class discrete mixture random parameter logit model (LSC-DM-RPL, Eq. 9).
From the RPL model, we see that, on average, people prefer increased protection of
cold-water coral and that there is considerable heterogeneity in preferences as evident by
the significant standard deviations. Interestingly, we observe that on average people do not
prefer to protect areas that are important for the oil- and gas industry, but that they do prefer
to protect areas that are important for the fisheries. Again we observe a large degree of
preference heterogeneity. This result has been discussed in detail by Aanesen et al. (2015)
and Sandorf et al. (2016), and is possibly a result of information provided in the videos, where
respondents learned that the largest threat to cold-water corals is bottom trawling. Lastly, it
seems that people care most about protecting reefs that are important habitat for fish.
In this paper we are concerned with the impact of inattentive respondents.12 Our defini-
tions of inattentiveness relate to whether or not a respondent watched either, both or none of
the information videos to completion. The first video concerned information about the envi-
ronmental good and the second—the discrete choice experiment. This allow us to explore
whether inattention to different pieces of information affects results. In the second model
we have interacted our measures with the means of the preference distributions to explore
how our measures affect marginal utility. This model fits the data better, but the BIC statistic,
which penalizes additional parameters heavily, suggests that the gain in fit does not outweigh
the negative impact of estimating an additional 12 parameters. Nevertheless, we do gain some
insights, the most important of which is that respondents who failed to watch the entire video
about the discrete choice experiment have higher cost sensitivity, and a lower mean marginal
utility of the size and habitat attributes. This indicates that these individuals are choosing
alternatives that are cheaper or the status quo. Relatedly, not having received information
about the attributes might lead to a focus on “self-explanatory” attributes such as cost, which
translates into a higher sensitivity for this attribute. Furthermore, this result is supported
by the attribute non-attendance models, which show that the probability of attendance is
slightly higher for those that failed to watch the second video to completion. The evidence
for respondents failing to watch the entire video about the environmental good is mixed, but
they appear to prefer a small increase in protection and they have lower mean marginal utility
for the industry and habitat attributes.
In Tables 7 and 8 in “Appendix B”, we show models estimated using our definition of
“dishonesty” and the strictest definitions of inattentiveness and “dishonesty”, respectively.
Looking at the RPL with observed heterogeneity reported in Table 7, we see that respondents
who stated that they watched the first video when they did not have a higher cost sensitivity,
and lower mean marginal utility for the habitat attribute. The latter effect is stronger for those
stating that they watched the second video, when in fact they didn’t. Interestingly, it suggests
12 We report the models for dishonesty in “Appendix B” and make reference to these models where appropriate.
123
E. D. Sandorf
Ta
bl
e
5
Es
tim
at
io
n
re
su
lts
:i
n
at
te
nt
iv
e
re
sp
on
de
nt
s
R
PL
R
PL
w
/o
bs
.
LS
C-
RP
L
D
M
-R
PL
LS
C-
D
M
-R
PL
Es
tim
at
e
SE
Es
tim
at
e
SE
Es
tim
at
e
SE
Es
tim
at
e
SE
Es
tim
at
e
SE
μ
Co
st
0.
91
08
**
*
0.
19
85
0.
63
88
**
*
0.
39
01
1.
30
78
**
*
0.
14
34
2.
30
56
**
*
0.
28
47
1.
56
06
**
*
0.
40
16
ζ C
os
t In
at
te
nt
iv
e1
0.
09
73
0.
41
59
ζ C
os
t In
at
te
nt
iv
e2
1.
36
20
**
*
0.
37
24
σ
Co
st
3.
39
09
**
*
0.
22
05
3.
25
68
**
*
0.
21
02
3.
79
48
**
*
0.
25
09
2.
11
09
**
*
0.
29
10
2.
12
71
**
*
0.
22
32
8
μ
Si
ze
-
sm
al
l
0.
12
80
0.
12
92
0.
10
84
0.
09
89
0.
68
32
**
*
0.
08
15
1.
38
73
**
*
0.
07
59
0.
63
79
6*
*
0.
36
95
2
ζ S
iz
e-
sm
al
l In
at
te
nt
iv
e1
0.
42
35
**
*
0.
18
09
ζ S
iz
e-
sm
al
l In
at
te
nt
iv
e2
−0
.4
83
0*
*
0.
21
18
σ
Si
ze
-
sm
al
l
0.
50
70
**
*
0.
10
60
0.
52
98
**
*
0.
06
69
0.
27
35
**
*
0.
06
30
0.
05
71
0.
10
38
0.
03
18
77
0.
10
74
4
μ
Si
ze
-
la
rg
e
0.
31
22
**
*
0.
11
72
0.
35
59
**
*
0.
09
25
0.
84
90
**
*
0.
07
89
1.
51
77
**
*
0.
07
45
0.
75
99
3*
*
0.
36
96
ζ S
iz
e-
la
rg
e I
na
tte
nt
iv
e1
−0
.0
00
8
0.
17
69
ζ S
iz
e-
la
rg
e I
na
tte
nt
iv
e2
−0
.2
80
9*
0.
18
72
σ
Si
ze
-
la
rg
e
0.
65
74
**
*
0.
09
96
0.
64
02
**
*
0.
06
96
0.
43
07
**
*
0.
04
81
0.
25
89
**
*
0.
03
55
−0
.2
53
9*
**
0.
03
03
25
μ
In
du
str
y-
O
il&
G
as
−0
.1
99
3*
**
0.
06
62
−0
.1
56
0*
*
0.
07
60
−0
.2
18
1*
**
0.
07
82
−0
.8
37
9*
**
0.
30
12
−0
.3
69
97
**
0.
18
60
1
ζ I
nd
us
try
-
O
il&
G
as
In
at
te
nt
iv
e1
−0
.3
57
2*
**
0.
21
57
ζ I
nd
us
try
-
O
il&
G
as
In
at
te
nt
iv
e2
0.
21
82
0.
22
22
σ
In
du
str
y-
O
il&
G
as
0.
84
01
**
*
0.
08
78
0.
87
61
**
*
0.
07
69
0.
88
67
**
*
0.
10
27
1.
92
44
**
*
0.
33
53
−0
.8
49
88
*
*
*
0.
35
11
4
μ
In
du
str
y-
Fi
sh
er
ie
s
0.
14
60
**
0.
07
01
0.
18
56
**
*
0.
07
94
0.
15
69
**
0.
07
91
0.
23
69
0.
25
25
0.
14
74
3
0.
12
43
6
ζ I
nd
us
try
-
Fi
sh
er
ie
s I
na
tte
nt
iv
e1
−0
.3
11
4*
0.
21
96
ζ I
nd
us
try
-
Fi
sh
er
ie
s I
na
tte
nt
iv
e2
0.
17
34
0.
23
09
σ
In
du
str
y-
Fi
sh
er
ie
s
0.
85
36
**
*
0.
09
37
0.
87
90
**
*
0.
08
27
0.
87
44
**
*
0.
09
96
2.
06
69
**
*
0.
38
71
−0
.8
72
92
*
*
*
0.
36
18
2
μ
H
ab
ita
t
1.
19
55
**
*
0.
09
41
1.
49
76
**
*
0.
10
27
1.
48
57
**
*
0.
11
43
2.
28
01
**
*
0.
42
46
0.
87
59
6*
**
0.
36
76
4
ζ H
ab
ita
t In
at
te
nt
iv
e1
−0
.5
28
5*
*
0.
26
47
123
Did You Miss Something? Inattentive Respondents in Discrete…
Ta
bl
e
5
co
n
tin
ue
d
R
PL
R
PL
w
/o
bs
.
LS
C-
RP
L
D
M
-R
PL
LS
C-
D
M
-R
PL
Es
tim
at
e
SE
Es
tim
at
e
SE
Es
tim
at
e
SE
Es
tim
at
e
SE
Es
tim
at
e
SE
ζ H
ab
ita
t In
at
te
nt
iv
e2
−0
.9
56
6*
**
0.
28
29
σ
H
ab
ita
t
1.
41
38
**
*
0.
10
53
1.
29
08
**
*
0.
09
10
1.
35
69
**
*
0.
12
67
1.
10
30
**
0.
47
50
0.
60
73
1*
**
0.
25
31
8
λ
1
1.
00
00
λ
2
0.
07
26
**
*
0.
02
67
2.
24
77
0.
85
06
ψ
s
:
U
n
co
n
di
tio
na
lp
ro
ba
bi
lit
ie
so
fS
ca
le
Cl
as
s2
ψ
(
At
te
n
ti
v
e
)
0.
11
44
**
*
0.
02
73
1.
00
00
**
*
0.
00
00
ψ
(I
n
a
tt
en
ti
v
e
1)
0.
21
95
**
*
0.
07
79
1.
00
00
**
*
0.
00
00
ψ
(I
n
a
tt
en
ti
v
e
2)
0.
24
36
**
*
0.
08
71
0.
87
01
**
*
0.
22
21
ψ
(I
n
a
tt
en
ti
v
e
1&
2)
0.
41
21
**
*
0.
08
22
0.
76
50
**
*
0.
19
33
π
qk
:
U
n
co
n
dt
io
na
lp
ro
ba
bi
lit
ie
so
fa
tte
nd
an
ce
π
Si
ze
(
At
te
n
ti
v
e
)
0.
57
70
**
*
0.
03
69
0.
57
02
**
*
0.
03
62
π
Si
ze
(I
n
a
tt
en
ti
v
e
1)
0.
45
90
**
*
0.
08
79
0.
46
69
**
*
0.
09
00
π
Si
ze
(I
n
a
tt
en
ti
v
e
2)
0.
43
14
**
*
0.
09
39
0.
46
94
**
*
0.
10
04
π
Si
ze
(I
n
a
tt
en
ti
v
e
1&
2)
0.
32
06
**
*
0.
06
35
0.
36
87
**
*
0.
07
81
π
In
du
str
y(
At
te
n
ti
v
e
)
0.
35
18
**
*
0.
07
22
0.
36
39
**
*
0.
06
96
π
In
du
str
y(
In
a
tt
en
ti
v
e
1)
0.
13
95
*
0.
08
34
0.
14
32
*
0.
08
68
π
In
du
str
y(
In
a
tt
en
ti
v
e
2)
0.
37
17
**
0.
16
15
0.
41
74
**
0.
17
97
π
In
du
str
y(
In
a
tt
en
ti
v
e
1&
2)
0.
15
01
*
0.
07
74
0.
17
31
*
0.
09
13
π
H
ab
ita
t(
At
te
n
ti
v
e
)
0.
66
40
**
*
0.
13
02
0.
76
41
**
*
0.
11
70
π
H
ab
ita
t(
In
a
tt
en
ti
v
e
1)
0.
40
49
**
*
0.
14
65
0.
48
97
**
*
0.
15
74
π
H
ab
ita
t(
In
a
tt
en
ti
v
e
2)
0.
28
67
**
0.
13
75
0.
38
95
**
0.
17
93
π
H
ab
ita
t(
In
a
tt
en
ti
v
e
1&
2)
0.
12
15
**
0.
05
37
0.
15
89
**
0.
06
99
123
E. D. Sandorf
Ta
bl
e
5
co
n
tin
ue
d
R
PL
R
PL
w
/o
bs
.
LS
C-
RP
L
D
M
-R
PL
LS
C-
D
M
-R
PL
Es
tim
at
e
SE
Es
tim
at
e
SE
Es
tim
at
e
SE
Es
tim
at
e
SE
Es
tim
at
e
SE
π
Co
st
(
At
te
n
ti
v
e
)
0.
67
09
**
*
0.
05
57
0.
66
65
**
*
0.
04
15
π
Co
st
(I
n
a
tt
en
ti
v
e
1)
0.
69
48
**
*
0.
08
89
0.
69
92
**
*
0.
08
34
π
Co
st
(I
n
a
tt
en
ti
v
e
2)
0.
72
28
**
*
0.
09
57
0.
73
76
**
*
0.
08
87
π
Co
st
(I
n
a
tt
en
ti
v
e
1&
2)
0.
74
44
**
*
0.
07
20
0.
76
57
**
*
0.
06
76
Lo
g
lik
el
ih
oo
d
−4
08
8.
61
15
−4
05
8.
41
62
−4
04
8.
07
17
−3
90
2.
61
03
−3
90
0.
91
15
A
dj.
Ps
eu
do
R
2
0.
37
79
0.
38
07
0.
38
35
0.
40
43
0.
40
40
A
IC
82
01
.2
22
9
81
64
.8
32
4
81
28
.1
43
4
78
53
.2
20
5
78
57
.8
22
9
B
IC
82
81
.6
17
1
83
25
.6
20
7
82
35
.3
35
6
80
14
.0
08
9
80
45
.4
09
3
N
60
00
60
00
60
00
60
00
60
00
K
12
24
16
24
28
‘
*
’–
10
%
le
v
el
,‘
*
*
’–
5%
le
v
el
,‘
*
*
*
’–
1%
le
v
el
.T
es
tf
or
sig
ni
fic
an
ce
o
fs
ca
le
is
ag
ai
ns
t1
123
Did You Miss Something? Inattentive Respondents in Discrete…
that these “dishonest” individuals are somewhat different to those that are purely inattentive.
Turning our attention to the same model reported in Table 8, we see that a similar pattern
holds, but that the results are, to a large extent, driven by the strict definition of inattentive-
ness. This supports the results reported above, that it is not necessarily inattentiveness to, or
unfamiliarity with, the environmental good that drives results, but rather when it relates to
the discrete choice experiment itself.
We hypothesized that inattentive respondents might have a less deterministic choice pro-
cess as seen from the econometrician’s point of view. To test this we developed a latent scale
class model, which allow us to make probabilistic statements about the likelihood that a given
respondent is in a class with a relatively smaller or larger scale parameter. This model is similar
to a latent class model, but we do not classify respondents based on different preferences (in
fact we have imposed an equality constraint across classes), but rather based on different scale
parameters. We see from Table 5 that the model allowing for different scale parameters fit the
data better than the standard RPL model, and that at 4 additional parameters both the AIC and
BIC statistic support this. In our preferred model we operate with two latent scale classes.13
First, we note that the signs and significance of the estimates remain largely the same, but that
several are larger compared to the RPL model. That said, any direct comparison is not possible
due to different scaling of the models, but it is worth noting that considering scale differences
within the model does lead to larger estimates. This is expected since we are separating out
individuals with a very small scale parameter. In Scale Class (SC) 1, we have normalized the
scale parameter to unity and in SC 2 we used an exponential transformation and let it be freely
estimated. We are making the reader aware that the estimate for the scale parameter reported
in Table 5 is the transformed estimate. The estimated scale parameter in SC 2 is 0.0726 and is
significantly different from both zero and one,14 which implies that the two classes describe
different degrees of choice certainty and that SC 2 is characterized by an almost random choice
process as seen from the econometrician’s point of view. This is in line with the results pre-
sented by Gao et al. (2016b) and Jones et al. (2015a). As the scale parameter approaches zero,
the probability of choosing an alternative approaches 1/J , where J is the number of alter-
natives, which implies that the probability of choosing any alternative is equal. Rather than
reporting the covariates of the class probability function, we report the unconditional prob-
abilities directly. On average, people are unlikely to be in SC2, but that people who failed to
watch the first or second video are about twice as likely as those watched both, and those that
failed to watch either to completion are about four times as likely as those who watched both
with a predicted class probability of 40 %. Again, we see this result reflected in the models
reported in Tables 7 and 8, where what appears to be driving the results are lying about watch-
ing the first video and inattentiveness. It is less clear now whether it is failure to watch the first
or second video that drives results, but we note that the unconditional probability of being in
SC2 is slightly higher for those failing to watch the video about the discrete choice experiment.
This indicates that having less information is linked to a more stochastic choice process as
seen from the econometrician’s point of view. Taken together this evidence suggests that inat-
13 During our model search we found that moving beyond two classes led to only marginal increase in the
log-likelihood value and was not supported by the AIC or BIC statistics. Furthermore, moving beyond four
classes resulted in numerical instability and convergence issues.
14 To test whether the scale parameter is different from zero, we use a standard t-test. We obtain the standard
error of the transformed estimate, i.e. exp(−2.6224), using the Delta method. Then we construct the test-
statistic: t = exp(−2.6224)/0.0267 = 0.0726/0.0267 = 2.7188, which is higher than the critical value of
2.576 at the 1% level. Similarly, we can test whether it is different from one. We construct the test-statistic:
t = (exp(−2.6224)−1)/0.0267 = (0.0726−1)/0.0267 = −34.7154, which again is statistically significant
at the 1% level.
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Fig. 1 Distribution of conditional probabilities of scale class membership by model. a Conditional probability
of being in scale class 2 in the LSC model. b Conditional probability of being in scale class 2 in the LSC-DM-
RPL model
tentiveness, measured as not watching the videos, drives the results, with the effect of failing
to watch the second video to completion being slightly higher. In Fig. 1a we have plotted the
empirical distribution of conditional class membership probabilities for each of the groups.
We see that those who did not watch one of the videos to completion are more likely to be in SC
2, but that those who watched neither to completion are much more likely to be in this class.
We hypothesized that inattentive respondents have put less effort into the choice tasks and
as such are more likely to ignore one or more of the attributes. We use a combination of dis-
crete and continuous mixture models to uncover the full set of possible AN-A strategies while
considering preference heterogeneity using a RPL model. In Table 5 we see that the DM-RPL
model represents a large improvement in model fit (186 log likelihood units), and that at 12
additional parameters this is supported by both the AIC and BIC statistic. Considering AN-A
behavior leads to changes in some parameters compared to the RPL model, however, we note
that a direct comparison of parameter estimates is inappropriate. Nonetheless, a few points
are worth discussing. The standard deviation for size—small and the mean for industry—
fisheries are now insignificant. This suggests that the heterogeneity we observed with regard
to size—small was in part caused by respondents ignoring the attribute. On average, people
are indifferent to protect areas that are important for the fisheries, but we do observe large
heterogeneity associated with this attribute. An interesting observation is that the means of
the parameter distributions are relatively larger than the corresponding standard deviations,
except for the industry attributes, which was not the case in the RPL model. This suggests that
there is a potential confounding between preference- and attribute processing heterogeneity
(Hess et al. 2013).
In Table 5 we report the unconditional probabilities of attendance and the corresponding
standard errors rather than the covariates of the probability functions. What we see is that
inattentive respondents, by any measure, are less likely to attend to the non-cost attributes,
but that they are more likely to attend to the cost attribute. We see that respondents failing to
watch the video about the discrete choice experiment, where the attributes and levels were
explained, are much less likely to attend to the non-cost attributes, with the exception of the
industry attribute, and more likely to attend to the cost attribute. The results are strongest for
those that failed to watch both videos to completion. Again, this underlines the importance
of providing proper information about the attributes. These results suggest that respondents
who lack such information are more likely to ignore attributes. If we look at the sensitivity
analyses reported in Tables 7 and 8, we see that the results are somewhat similar with the
drivers being lying about watching the first video and inattentiveness in the form of failing
to watch both to completion. As such, our investigations provide partial support for the
hypothesis that inattentive respondents are more likely to ignore attributes.
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Fig. 2 Distribution of the conditional probabilities of attending to the attributes by our measures of inatten-
tiveness in the DM-RPL model. a Size attribute. b Industry attribute. c Habitat attribute. d Cost attribute
In Fig. 2 we have plotted the distributions of conditional probabilities of attendance for
each attribute.15 We see that inattentive respondents are less likely to attend to the non-
cost attributes and more likely to attend to the cost attribute with those failing to watch
both videos to completion much less likely to attend to the non-cost attributes. While the
rates of attendance vary by sub-group, it is reassuring that irrespective of what group a
respondent belongs to—they appear to attend to the cost attribute. The fact that inattentive
respondents are more likely to attend to this attribute suggests that they focus on an attribute
that might be familiar or self-explanatory, which supports the observations in the RPL model
with observed heterogeneity. Given that inattentive respondents have not watched the entire
information video about cold-water corals and/or the DCE and that they are less likely to
have higher education, it seems a reasonable strategy to focus on an attribute that is familiar
and self-explanatory.
In the last column of Table 5, we report the results from the model that simultaneously
uncovers all three sources of heterogeneity. We see that the preference distributions are
relatively similar to those uncovered in the other models, and we will not reiterate these
results in detail. First, let us discuss the latent scale class model. We see that the estimated
scale parameter is relatively large, which would indicate a relatively more deterministic choice
process as seen from the econometricians point of view, however, the estimated parameter is
not significantly different from 1. This indicates that both scale classes represent the same
level of choice determinism. This is also evident by the fact that everyone is predicted to
be in the same scale class.16 In Fig. 1b we have plotted the distribution of conditional scale
class probabilities by inatentiveness. What this indicates is that considering attribute non-
15 These conditional probabilities are obtained by summing, for each individual, the conditional class mem-
bership probabilities over the classes where a particular attribute was attended to.
16 The fact that the scale parameters do not differ between classes might lead to a potential identification
problem. It is very difficult for the model to predict class membership when there are no differences between
classes. Furthermore, we observed evidence in this respect since the log-likelihood function appeared flat in
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Fig. 3 Distribution of the conditional probabilities of attending to the attributes by our measures of inatten-
tiveness in the LSC-DM-RPL model. a Size attribute. b Industry attribute. c Habitat attribute. d Cost attribute
attendance mitigates the observed scale differences between subgroups of respondents. This
conjecture is further supported by the small increase in model fit. A likelihood ratio test fails to
reject the null hypothesis that the final model has the same explanatory power as the attribute
non-attendance model. This result is potentially important since it points to one possible
source of scale heterogeneity. That said, the more heterogeneity we try to capture with our
models, the more closely we tailor it to the data. We note that the predicted unconditional
probabilities of attendance remain comparable across models. These results are mirrored
in the models reported in Tables 7 and 8. In Fig. 3, we have plotted the distributions of
conditional probabilities of attending to the attributes and they show the same pattern of
results.
5.3 Willingness-to-Pay
In this section we take a closer look at the willingness-to-pay derived from each of the five
models.17 Rather than focusing on the unconditional estimates, we derive WTP conditional
on a respondent’s sequence of choices. These conditional, i.e. individual specific, estimates
gives an indication as to where the respondent lies on the willingness-to-pay distribution. In
Table 6 we report the .05, .50, and .95 percentiles and the mean of the means of the conditional
the region of convergence for the parameters in the scale class probability function. This holds true for the
models estimated and reported in “Appendix B” as well.
17 The WTP estimates reported here differ from those reported in Sandorf et al. (2016). Sandorf et al. (2016)
used an RPL estimated in “willingness-to-pay space”, with non-cost attributes following normal distributions
and cost following a log-normal distribution. The rather large estimates found here are likely caused by the
log-normally distributed cost parameter with a mass close to zero, and the log-normal distribution for the size-
small and size-large attribute levels. Considering respondents ignoring attributes leads to more reasonable
WTP estimates.
123
Did You Miss Something? Inattentive Respondents in Discrete…
distributions. We calculate separate descriptive statistics of the conditional WTP estimates
and report them separately for the various inattentiveness measures.
First, we see that the estimates from the RPL and RPL with observed heterogeneity
are rather large and arguably unreasonable. The mean estimates are far above the highest
cost level used in the discrete choice experiment and the .05 and .95 percentiles suggests a
rather large spread. Although the mean is large, the median estimates are more in line with
expectations, which suggests that the estimates are affected by distributional assumptions and
outliers (more on this later). We see that in general inattentive respondents have lower WTP.
This is expected given the evidence that inattentive respondents have a higher sensitivity to
cost. Turning our attention to the LSC model, we see that the means, median and spread
are even larger. This result is likely caused by the larger standard deviation of the cost
parameter. When we consider respondents ignoring attributes in the choice tasks we observe
large changes to willingness-to-pay. We see that they become substantially smaller and in
line with expectations. The means of the WTP distributions are now also within the ranges
given by the cost attribute. This result is consistent with the majority of papers exploring
attribute non-attendance (see e.g. Hensher et al. 2005; Campbell et al. 2010). We observe
only small changes in WTP between the DM-RPL and LSC-DM-RPL models, however, this
is not surprising given how similar the models were. Turning our attention to the differences
between attentive and inattentive respondents we see that, on average, inattentive respondents
have lower WTP and narrower distributions of the conditional means compared to attentive
ones. This is potentially connected to inattentive respondents’ greater propensity to ignore
one or more of the attributes in the choice tasks as well as a higher cost sensitivity.
It is apparent that the estimates from the RPL, RPL with heterogeneity and the LSC
are rather large and arguably unreasonable. We propose 3 possible reasons why these
willingness-to-pay estimates are inflated. First, when calculating WTP from a random param-
eters logit model, the distribution of willingness-to-pay is the ratio of two independent
distributions. Other authors show that this could lead to questionable signs and magni-
tudes of the resulting ratio distribution (Hensher and Greene 2011). One likely culprit is the
choice of a log-normal distribution for the cost parameter. While the log-normal distribution
is appealing from a statistical standpoint [i.e. existing moments of the willingness-to-pay
distribution (Daly et al. 2012)] and a behavioral standpoint (all respondents have a nega-
tive sign for the cost coefficient), it can have support close to zero, which leads to rather
large WTP estimates. In addition, both the distribution in the numerator and denominator
are unbounded—potentially leading to large outliers. In this data, both of these issues are
present. Indeed, from Table 5 we see that the small and significant estimate of the mean of
the underlying normal distribution for the cost parameter combined with a large standard
deviation does suggest support close to zero. Looking at the WTP estimates themselves,
we see that the mean estimates from the RPL model are relatively large, but the median
estimates are substantially smaller and more reasonable. Taken together with a visual inspec-
tion of the WTP distributions, it is reasonable to conclude that these factors contribute to
the inflated estimates. Second, it can be the result of respondents ignoring one or more
of the attributes. In fact we see that once we consider respondents ignoring attributes, the
mean of the underlying normal distribution for cost increase by an order of magnitude sug-
gesting that a smaller part of the cost distribution is close to zero. This is reflected in the
willingness-to-pay estimates from the DM-RPL model, which are not only substantially
smaller, but more reasonable. It also underlines the importance of considering the potential
simplifying strategies that respondents use when participating in discrete choice experi-
ments. This result conforms to the majority of findings in the literature, which suggests
that considering attribute non-attendance leads to smaller WTP estimates (see e.g. Hen-
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sher et al. 2005; Campbell et al. 2010). A third point related to the LSC model is that
when we consider potential scale differences between subgroups of respondents, the rela-
tive relationship between the mean and standard deviations of some attributes change. For
example, in the LSC model, the standard deviation of cost becomes relatively larger com-
pared to, for example, the RPL model. This indicates a larger variation in the denominator
of the WTP distribution. Taken together with the relatively larger means in the distributions
describing non-cost attributes—this can potentially explain the wider spread of conditional
WTP.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we use data from an internet panel discrete choice experiment aimed at eliciting
preferences for increased cold-water coral protection in Norway (Aanesen et al. 2015; Sandorf
et al. 2016). We identified a group of inattentive respondents—respondents who failed to
watch information videos about the environmental good and the discrete choice experiment
to completion. Given recent interest in inattentive respondents, and the growing concerns that
these respondents spend less effort answering the survey, we test two hypotheses in the context
of a discrete choice experiment: inattentive respondents (a) have less deterministic choices
as seen from the econometrician’s point of view, and (b) are more likely to ignore attributes
in the choice tasks. We test both hypotheses separately and jointly in a modeling framework
that can simultaneously address preference, scale and attribute processing heterogeneity.
We find partial support for both hypotheses. First, we find that inattentive respondents
are more likely to be in a scale class characterized by a relatively smaller scale parameter,
and they are more likely to ignore the non-cost attributes. This is similar to what was found
by Jones et al. (2015b), however, their results were based on tests on different samples
where inattentive respondents were excluded. That said, when we simultaneously test our
hypotheses the differences in scale disappear. This suggests that what we observed in terms of
scale heterogeneity between the groups of respondents was in fact non-modeled differences
in the propensity to ignore attributes. This points to a possible source of differences in error
variance between respondents and shows that failing to address sources of heterogeneity
might lead the researcher to make the wrong inferences. This argument was also made by
Campbell et al. (2018). Turning our attention to the willingness-to-pay estimates, we find
that, in general, inattentive respondents have lower mean willingness-to-pay, which is driven
by a higher cost sensitivity. This is in contrast to Gao et al. (2016b) who reported higher
WTP. It is possible that this difference is caused by the identification of inattentiveness,
which in our case is inattentiveness to crucial information in the discrete choice experiment.
Furthermore, we find that considering AN-A leads to substantially lower WTP estimates
that are more in line with expectations and means that are within the range of the cost
attribute.
Interestingly, defining inattentiveness as failing to watch the video about the environmental
good or the video about the discrete choice experiment reveals a potentially important result.
It appears the differences in cost sensitivity, scale class membership and ignoring attributes
are driven by a failure to watch the video about the discrete choice experiment where the
attributes and levels are described. This suggests a focus on a familiar and self-explanatory
attribute when making their choices. It also suggests that a failure to watch this video leads
to uncertainty about how to complete the choice tasks, which explains the relatively more
stochastic choice process as seen from a practitioner’s point of view. Crucially, this result
123
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suggests that stated preference practitioners need to pay close attention to information provi-
sion, and especially try to make sure that respondents understand how to answer the choice
tasks. Furthermore, these results also emphasize the importance of including time-stamps in
our surveys. In addition to being able to detect pure speeding behavior, we can use them as
proxies for whether or not a respondent have received all the necessary information. Even
in the cases where information is presented as text—time stamps can provide information
on whether it is likely that respondents have read it. Moving forward, testing hypotheses in
this direction might provide fruitful. In this data it appears that neither receiving information
about the good to be valued nor the results of the quiz over this information was strongly
correlated with failure to watching the second video. Future research can consider to include
instrumental checks, e.g. a quiz or trial choice task, can help gauge whether or not a respon-
dent understands how to answer a choice task. This will allow for a cleaner test of the results
obtained in this paper.
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Appendix A
See Fig. 4.
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Fig. 4 Sample choice card—cold-water coral study
Appendix B
see Tables 7 and 8.
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